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Abstract
We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive
banking sector that shares information, and from an alternative hidden lender. The
presence of the hidden lender restricts the contracts that can be obtained from the
banking sector. In equilibrium some borrowers obtain funds from both the banking
sector and the ineﬃcient hidden lender simultaneously. We further show that as the cost
of borrowing from the hidden lender increases, total welfare increases. We generalize
the model to allow for a partially hidden lender and obtain qualitatively similar results.
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1 Introduction
Households have many potential sources of credit available, including secured mortgages,
installment loans, bank overdrafts, store credit, credit cards, payday loans, borrowing from
family, and borrowing from other “informal” sources. Similarly, small and large firms face
a number of diﬀerent financing options ranging from private placements, securitized loans,
trade credit, and personal loans to the owner. These alternative forms of financing diﬀer
in a number of ways. While some of these diﬀerences might be endogenous (such as the
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interest rate, or the term length for repayment), there are also exogenous diﬀerences–for
instance, with respect to the seniority of the claims and enforcement.
An empirical puzzle is that borrowers appear to borrow from apparently costly lenders
while not fully exhausting cheaper sources. Gross and Souleles (2002), for example, report
that in a large sample of credit card holders, almost 70% percent of those borrowing on
bankcards have positive housing equity. Similarly, small businesses often use uncollater-
alized trade credit when collateral and collateralized loans are available. Finally, there
is both theoretical work and empirical evidence of formal and informal sources of credit
coexisting in developing countries (Bell et al (1997), Bose (1998), Jain (1999)). In these
cases where some agents simultaneously borrow from both sources, it is unclear whether
agents are rationed by the formal sector before they access the informal one.1
We suggest that an important consideration in understanding this puzzle is that while
some lenders share information about borrowers, others do not.2 This allows borrowers
the chance to conceal liquidity shocks that aﬀect their creditworthiness by borrowing from
junior lenders whose loans are hard to observe by senior lenders. Thus, even when seniority
is well defined, a senior lender cares about the existence of junior lenders because the
possibility that the borrower is using them aﬀects the information obtained through interim
repayments.
As an example, missing a lease payment can trigger a renegotiation with the financier
and lead to a higher future interest rate. This reflects the financier’s renewed assessment
of the borrower’s ability to repay. An eﬀort to renegotiate the loan may well be costly for
the borrower, because of the information revealed in the process. This can be interpreted
as an endogenous renegotiation cost.
In order to avoid this penalty, the borrower might borrow from elsewhere to conceal the
bad news that she has suﬀered a liquidity shock. In turn, this makes missing a payment
even worse news as it reflects a liquidity shock so large that it is prohibitively costly to
conceal. The presence of a hidden lender increases this informational penalty and leads
1While some of this literature posits a tradeoﬀ between an informal sector, with better information about
borrowers’ abilities to repay, and a formal sector with a lower cost of capital, the information available to
the informal lender does not play any role in our model.
2Note that other explanations have been posited to explain this apparent puzzle; for example, Laibson
et al. (2001) calibrate a model of life-cycle borrowing with time inconsistent preferences, and Haliassos and
Reiter (2003) discuss a model of separate mental accounts. The results of this paper need not contradict
such explanations but can be seen as complementary to them. While our results (as any models which
assume fully rational consumers) fail to explain the coexistence of credit card debt and liquid assets, they
can be seen as suggesting some endogenous illiquidity of certain assets.
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to higher renegotiation costs. In the model that we present, the resulting overall cost of
renegotiation is suﬃciently high so that the financier would repossess the asset or foreclose
following a missed payment.
We illustrate these ideas more formally in a two-period model, where heterogeneous
agents can access two sources of funds: a competitive banking sector that shares infor-
mation, and an opaque lending sector. Banks are senior claimants and seek to obtain
information regarding borrowers through interim payments. While, most of our discussion
views banks as providing flexible long-term (two period) financing, one could also interpret
the banking sector as providing a sequence of short-term loans.
Our principal results are that in the absence of the opaque sector realized contracts are
complex menus. Higher levels of interim payments lead to lower final payments. This is
not only to take into account that less is owed, but also because a higher interim payment
reflects that the borrower is less of a credit risk.3 However, with a viable alternative hidden
lender, a borrower might be tempted to borrow from that source in order to disguise her
type. This possibility is anticipated by the original lender in the banking sector. In the
model the unique equilibrium results in only a single level of interim payment observed
in the banking sector. Further, some agents borrow from the opaque sector to make this
payment. Thus, in equilibrium, these agents are simultaneously borrowing from both the
banking and the opaque sectors.
We consider how the welfare of consumers and the transparent sector vary with the
cost of borrowing from the opaque source. In particular, a lower cost of borrowing benefits
consumers for a fixed level of borrowing, but it also encourages a greater number of ineﬃ-
cient types to continue to borrow rather than terminate the debt contract and would lead
the contract in the transparent sector to change. Overall welfare falls.4
A key element of the model is that a lender may not perfectly observe all the loans
that a borrower may hold. Empirically, this is certainly the case. For example, although
information sharing takes place through credit bureaus, there are many lenders who choose
neither to pay for access to credit bureaus nor to provide information to them. Trade credit,
informal, black market lending and payday lenders are clear examples. Further examples
3This result mirrors the observation in Allen (1985) that long-term contracts allow interim payments to
provide information.
4This result is to some an extent an application of the general theory of the second best, discussed by
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956). This states that in the presenece of some market imperfections that cannot
be eliminated, there is no guarantee that a move towards eliminating other market imperfections will make
the market more eﬃcient and indeed it may make the market less eﬃcient.
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include consumer credit, store credit and other sources that do not participate in formal
information-gathering credit bureaus, both in developing countries and elsewhere currently
and historically. Even when a lender has access to a credit bureau, the costs associated
with accessing and processing the relevant information may lead lenders to obtain and use
this information only in particular circumstances. Such circumstances would include the
loan approval stage, missed payments, and renegotiation. Otherwise there is unlikely to
be continual monitoring. In this paper, we simply take it for granted that some types of
borrowing are not commonly observed by all lenders.5
The banking sector cannot write contracts that make payments depend on the agent’s
borrowing from the hidden lender. This is a natural consequence of the assumption that the
banking sector cannot observe borrowing from the hidden lender. This paper is therefore
related to a growing literature on non-exclusive contracts and on hidden savings, which in-
cludes Allen (1985), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), Bisin, and Guaitoli (2004), and Doepke
and Townsend (2004). Our model diﬀers from those in a number of respects and in its
motivation. In particular, we consider diﬀerent lending sectors that vary in the information
that they have, we allow for adverse selection rather than presenting a pure moral hazard
model (Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) for example), and we
model agents to be risk-neutral with limited liability, rather than risk-averse and seeking
to smooth consumption or buy insurance–an important focus of this literature.
A key aspect of our analysis is varying the cost of borrowing from the hidden source.6
Allen (1985) and others focus on the case where this cost is equal to the social planner’s
rate. Innes (1990), in order to generate monotonicity in repayment schedules, considers
the case where money can be repaid immediately so that essentially the cost of borrowing
is zero.
Section 2 of this paper introduces the model and elaborates the key assumptions. In
Section 3, we solve for the equilibrium and characterize the principal results; in particular,
we discuss comparative statics with respect to the cost of borrowing from the opaque sector
and implications for welfare. We briefly discuss an extension to the case where borrowing
5For further information on consumer credit reporting in the US and further references both on the
theory and development of credit bureaus and reporting institution, the interested reader is referred to
Hunt (2002).
6The general model of Doepke and Townsend (2004), as illustrated in their example in Section 7.1, allows
for this more general interest rate; however, as in Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2003), they consider hidden saving and insurance rather than hidden borrowing and focus on numerical
rather than analytical solutions.
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from the opaque sector can be observed with some probability in Section 4. The final
section concludes.
2 The Model
Although the underlying economic mechanisms have wider applicability, we focus the model
on the particular example of a start-up firm that is raising funds for an investment project.
We first present the basic set-up, timing, and structure of the model. We then introduce
additional assumptions that rule out uninteresting cases and simplify the analysis of the
model.
2.1 Set-up
We introduce a two-period model to consider the interaction between alternative sources
of borrowing, a transparent banking sector, and an opaque hidden lending sector. In
the transparent sector, credit is provided by a continuum of agents that we call banks.
Banks are risk-neutral deep pockets, and there is competition among them. Banks share
information, and so the borrowing position of any agent with a bank is perfectly observable
and verifiable among all banks. We normalize the gross riskless market interest rate of this
formal sector to one. The principal assumptions on the banking sector can be summarized
as follows:
Assumption 1: The total amount of loanable funds in the banking sector exceeds de-
mand.
Assumption 2: A borrower can repay her outstanding balance and switch to another
bank at any point in time.
Assumption 3: Banks perfectly share the information about the borrower’s outstanding
loans.
These assumptions guarantee both that banks do not make a profit on average and that
conditional on the information known at any point in time, every contract oﬀered must
break even. In short, there can be no observable cross-subsidies between borrowers. If a
set of borrowers knew and were able to prove to a third party that they are subsidizing
other borrowers, they would switch to another bank, leaving their previous bank with only
subsidized borrowers and so losses.7 Note that we assume that banks are committed to
7Note that the assumption of perfect competition within the banking sector is not crucial for our results.
If there were small costs in switching banks, for example, in the absence of an opaque sector, banks will
oﬀer contracts that are contingent on type (although not fully contingent). The introduction of a hidden
sector would still lead to less contingent contracts and reduce welfare.
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sharing information. In particular this implies that they cannot simply replicate the hidden
lender as they have no means to hide such contracts from other banks.
In addition to the transparent banking sector we introduce an alternative opaque lend-
ing sector that lends at a flat repayment rate r (r > 1), which is exogenously given.8 A
key characteristic of this alternative borrowing source is that it does not share information
with the rest of the financial system. That is, the borrowing position of any agent in
the opaque sector is not observable by banks. Further, we model the opaque sector as a
junior lender. This is certainly consistent with an interpretation as trade credit or credit
cards.9 In our model lenders exogenously belong to either the banking sector or the opaque
sector. Pagano and Japelli (1993) discuss determinants of belonging to either group as an
endogenous decision.
Demand for funds come from borrowers who require these funds for an investment
project, and who are heterogeneous in the quality of their projects. They are risk neutral
and maximize total consumption across periods. We assume that they have all the bar-
gaining power and propose contracts before knowing their types. This assumption may not
be crucial for the qualitative insights; however, it is convenient in characterizing a unique
equilibrium outcome.
The timing of the model is as follows:
At t = 0 each borrower does not know her type. In order to raise D units of funding
necessary to invest in the project, the borrower proposes a schedule of first and associated
second period repayments {p, q(p)} to a bank.
At t = 12 , each borrower learns the type of her project, which is parametrized by
α ∼ U [0, 1]. At this point, the borrower can either liquidate the project and fully repay
the loan or continue with the project.10
At t = 1 agents realize a cash flow α that corresponds to their type. They can choose
to borrow d from the informal lending source. The informal lender is junior to the bank
loan, and banks do not observe d. Agents can use these funds to either consume or repay
p to the bank. Agents consume anything left over, so residual income cannot be used to
8This can be endogenized easily, as we discuss in the paragraph preceding Section 3.1.
9Other types of hidden lending, including informal lending or borrowing from family, are more ambiguous
with respect to seniority.
10We model this option to stop the project as a costless liquidation in a very early stage; but supposing
that the agent was able to recover a suﬃciently large salvage value at an early stage would generate similar
qualitative results.
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repay future debts.11
At t = 2 the project is successful and delivers B + α with probability ν. Otherwise the
project fails and delivers only α. In both cases, seniority of debt is such that the borrower
repays banks first and then repays opaque lenders up to rd. The borrower consumes all
the remaining funds.12
The parameter α represents the creditworthiness of the borrower, since the expected
final cash flow of the project is positively correlated with its interim cash flow. Note that
overall, a project of type α generates −D+α+ ν(B+α)+ (1− ν)α = −D+ νB+2α. We
define z = D − νB as a measure of the fraction of potential projects that are ineﬃcient.
High values of z denote a high proportion of ineﬃcient projects. In particular, z = 2 implies
that no projects should be funded, while z = 0 implies that all projects are eﬃcient and
should be funded. With intermediate values of z, only projects with α ≥ z2 are eﬃcient.
Figure ?? summarizes both the borrower’s actions and the payoﬀs required and gener-
ated by the investment project.
This concludes the set-up of the model that contains the basic elements required to
consider the implications of hidden borrowing for the structure of formal lending contracts.
In particular, agents must be heterogeneous, there must be two periods in order that interim
payoﬀs play a role, and there must be some possibility of default for the agent’s type to
have any meaningful consequences.
2.2 Further Assumptions
In this section, we add three auxiliary assumptions that help to simplify the analysis. The
first assumption ensures that contracts are renegotation-proof. Beyond the interpretation
of a succession of short-term contract, this allows the model to be seen naturally as charac-
terizing a long-term bank contract rather than a contract that is surely renegotiated. The
second assumption is a transversality condition that precludes unlimited borrowing. The
final assumption imposes parametric restrictions that rule out uninteresting cases.
Specifically we begin by making the following assumption, which ensures that banks
in the transparent sector break even both at the ex-ante and interim stages, as stated in
11 In fact consuming everything is optimal in the model even when the consumption good is costlessly
storable.
12Note that α is neither observable nor verifiable in Period 1 and it need not be in Period 2 in case of
a successful project outcome. We do assume however, that in case the project fails, triggering liquidation
and investigation, it becomes verifiable. Introducing a small verification cost in Period 2, in the spirit of
the costly state verification literature (Gale and Hellwig (1985)) would not aﬀect the qualitative results.
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Figure 1: Borrower actions and project payoﬀs
Lemma 1.13
Assumption 4: Some infinitesimal proportion of borrowers already know their own
types at t = 0.
Lemma 1 : The set of contracts p, q(p) is renegotiation proof and breaks even at all future
possible stages.
Proof. Competition between banks ensures that banks break even at the ex-ante stage.
Assumption 4 guarantees that the initial schedule of contracts is already contingent on
all the future public information about the borrower’s type so borrowers will eﬀectively not
switch (or renegotiate on the threat of switching) to another bank. This follows since if,
contingent on some possible future information, a contract contained cross subsidies then
among the small subset of agents that already know their type, subsidizing agents would
13The renegotiation-proof condition is eﬀectively equivalent to an exclusivity-proof contract–that is, a
contract that guarantees that at any point in time the borrower does not want to switch to another bank
(see Rampini and Bisin 2004). In the absence of Assumption 4, more general contracts could arise in period
0, but renegotiation would lead to the outcomes characterized by the model.
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propose alternative contracts to other banks while subsidized agents would stay.14 Thus,
those banks oﬀering contracts which allowed for cross subsidies would suﬀer losses.
As a transversality condition we make the following assumption:
Assumption 5: An agent cannot borrow from the opaque lender if the nominal value
of the loan is higher than the highest possible residual income.
This assumption can be understood as a “no fraud” condition. For example, it might
be appropriate if agents can be punished beyond limited liability if it were found (perhaps
with some probability) that they did not intend to repay in any possible state of the world.
This is a sensible borrowing limit, since most legal systems allow for punishment above
limited liability (i.e., prison or personal liability) whenever a borrower takes a loan that
she does not intend to repay even in the best possible situation. Alternatively if one thinks
of the alternative lender as an informal lender in development economies, as friends and
family, or as a black market, one could think that while limited liability may still hold,
it would not apply to agents that use the system without any intention of repayment.
Assumption 5 ensures that borrowing from the hidden source in order to consume will
not occur. Borrowing from the hidden sector to consume and repay in the good state is
ineﬃcient given that r > 1ν . Borrowing to consume would only be worthwhile if the agent
intends to default for sure and assumption 5 precludes this possibility.
Finally, we make parametric restrictions that preclude some trivial and uninteresting
cases.
Assumption 6: D > 2 and 2 > z = D − νB > 0
The first restriction ensures that no borrower can repay for sure; the second restric-
tions ensure that all types of borrowers will default to a diﬀerent extent if the project is
unsuccessful (so from the point of view of lenders they really are diﬀerent types) and in
particular, some projects are eﬃcient and some are not.
3 Equilibrium
The feasible strategies for the borrower are any oﬀer of schedules {p, q(p)} at t = 0.
Furthermore the borrower has to decide whether to pursue the project at t = 12 or liquidate.
Finally the borrower has to decide which payment from the schedule to pay, funding any
shortfall through borrowing from the hidden source. The bank has to choose whether to
14While one might consider that such oﬀers are oﬀ-equilibrium oﬀers and so might be rendered meaningless
by a modeler with judicious use of oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs. We focus on equilibria robust to the intuitive
criterion.
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agree to the proposed menu of contracts.
In order to characterize the equilibrium, we can draw on the revelation principle and
think of the borrower’s choice of repayment from the schedule {p, q(p)} as a function of
her type–that is, we could think of oﬀering a schedule {p(α), q(α)}. As discussed above,
in Lemma 1, any meaningful contract on the schedule–that is any contract that is ever
taken up in equilibrium–will break even at all the stages of the contract and so will not
contain any observable cross subsidies. Since there is competition among banks and given
that borrowers make oﬀers, the equilibrium schedule will maximize the ex-ante welfare of
consumers. Finally, associated with each of the payments that are ever made in equilibrium,
incentive compatibility must be satisfied (that is, once a borrower has learned her type α,
she prefers to pay p(α) rathe than any other p(α0)).
The equilibrium configuration crucially depends on whether the interest rate at which
the informal sector lends r is above or below the threshold 2−νν . We separate these two
cases in the discussion that follows.
Throughout, the exogenous interest rate r can be thought of as a measure of the degree
of ineﬃciency of the opaque sector. The break-even rate for r is 1ν , and this would be the
endogenous rate for the opaque sector if there were no other frictions or ineﬃciencies. In
this case r = 1ν , because regardless of the amount borrowed, the opaque lender will always
be repaid if the good state is realized and will always face default in the bad state.15
However, whether we think of the opaque lender as trade credit, a credit card, or informal
lender, it is reasonable to believe that the interest rate charged could be above this break-
even rate. Causes of an apparently high interest rate include that the opaque lender is
not as specialized as the bank in lending money and that informal credit is also used for
purposes other than concealing liquidity shocks. We therefore allow for the possibility that
r > 1ν .
3.1 Very ineﬃcient informal sector
In this section we explore the implications of a very ineﬃcient opaque sector. In particular
we explore the resulting equilibrium when r > 2−νν . We begin by characterizing an equilib-
rium where there is full separation among those types that borrow–that is, each diﬀerent
type repays the formal sector a diﬀerent interim payment and there is no borrowing from
15This follows from the seniority of bank debt, the size of the project, and Assumption 5. Note that this
is independent of the type of the project, and this is precisely the reason why the information held by the
hidden lender is irrelevant to our analysis.
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the opaque sector. We then go on to briefly discuss other equilibria and argue that they
are somewhat unreasonable.
Proposition 1 When the opaque sector lends at a suﬃciently high interest rate ( r > 2−νν ),
then there exists a fully separating equilibrium where consumers oﬀer the contract schedule
{p(α), q(α)} with the interim payment equal to the first period cashflow p(α) = α and the
corresponding final payment q(α) = D−α−(1−ν)αν . All types α <
z
2 liquidate at t =
1
2 .
Proof. The banks’ equilibrium beliefs are consistent with the borrower behaviour–that
is, banks believe that a type that pays p = α is an α-type (note that some types will simply
prefer to liquidate at the t = 12 stage).
This fully contingent contract has to fulfill the break-even and incentive compatibility
conditions.
Break-even condition: Given that the first payment p = α reveals the type of the agent
as α, the break-even condition for the second payment is D = α + νq + (1 − ν)α. This
determines that the break-even second payment q = D−p−(1−ν)pν .
We analyze the incentive compatibility condition by considering two deviations: imi-
tating a lower type and imitating a higher type.
Incentive compatibility condition 1: The contract needs to guarantee that no agent
wants to imitate a lower quality agent. Suppose that an agent of quality α claims to be a
lower quality agent α0 < α by paying a first payment p = α0; in that case, her total utility
would be (α−α0)+ν(B− D−α
0−(1−ν)α0
ν ). Note that (α−α0) is the additional consumption
at t = 1 from reporting a lower type, while (B − D−α
0−(1−ν)α0
ν ) is the net consumption in
the good state (which occurs with probability ν) after repaying q(α0). Instead, by revealing
her own type she would get ν(B− D−α−(1−ν)αν ). The diﬀerence between these two terms is
−(1− ν)(α−α0) < 0, and so it cannot be optimal to claim to be an agent of a lower type.
Incentive compatibility condition 2: The contract also needs to guarantee that no agent
wants to imitate a higher quality agent by borrowing from the hidden source and paying a
first payment p > α. Suppose for contradiction that an agent claims to be a higher quality
agent by paying a first payment p = α00 > α and borrowing α00−α from the hidden source to
fund this payment. The total utility of the agent would be ν(B−D−α
00−(1−ν)α00
ν −r(α00−α))
instead of ν(B− D−α−(1−ν)αν ). The diﬀerence between the two is (2−υ−υr)(α00−α) which
is negative if and only if r > 2−νν , so this is the necessary and suﬃcient condition for this
incentive compatibility condition to hold.
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Notice that oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs only apply to p > 1, and even assigning the most
optimistic beliefs to such oﬀers (that is α = 1) agents prefer their equilibrium contracts.
Lemma 2 The above equilibrium achieves first best.
Proof. In the first best a borrower should be funded if and only if she generates suﬃcient
expected revenues–that is, if and only if α + v(B + α) + (1 − ν)α ≥ 0. This is precisely
the marginal borrower in the equilibrium described above.
Corollary 1 In the absence of an opaque sector, the first best can be achieved.
Proof. The absence of an opaque sector is equivalent to r −→∞, and so the results above
apply.
Formally, beyond the equilibrium described in Proposition 1, there are many other
equilibria. First, there are some that are essentially observationally equivalent in the sense
that many other redundant (p, q(p)) contracts could be included in the oﬀered schedule
that are never taken up and that have no eﬀect on outcomes (for example contracts with
very high p’s and q’s). Henceforth we ignore such equilibria. A more substantive source
of multiplicity of equilibria arises from the private information on the part of a (small)
proportion of borrowers. As is common in these sorts of games, this opens the possibility
of equilibria where there is no borrowing; for example, supported by the beliefs that the
only oﬀers are from those borrowers who know that their own types are α = 0 (and such
beliefs are never challenged because oﬀers are oﬀ-equilibrium). We note that such equilibria
exist but could be refined away assuming trembles or other equilibrium refinements. Most
importantly, we find them unreasonable, and rather than dwell on such technicalities, we
focus instead on more eﬃcient equilibria–indeed we highlight above an equilibrium that
achieves first best.
To summarise this section, when the hidden lender is suﬃciently ineﬃcient, borrow-
ers do not attempt to conceal low interim cashflows and do not borrow from the hidden
lender. The resulting bank contract is flexible and allows for diﬀerent first payments with
corresponding final payments. An alternative interpretation for the schedule of possible
payments is to suppose instead that only one contract from the schedule is initially agreed
upon, but that the contract is renegotiated following the cashflow realization in the interim
period. The flexibility, under this interpretation, would therefore reflect low (endogenous)
costs of renegotiation.
12
3.2 Relatively Eﬃcient Informal Sector
In the previous section, we supposed that the opaque sector was so ineﬃcient, or equiva-
lently that the cost of borrowing from the opaque sector was so high, that it had no eﬀect
on outcomes and on the contracts taken up in the transparent sector. In this section, we
explore the equilibrium outcome when the opaque sector is more eﬃcient, that is when
r < 2−νν . Note in particular, that this regime includes the case where there are no frictions
in the opaque sector and r = 1ν .
In the proof of Proposition 1, we argued that in the case where types were fully sep-
arating in their payments and paid exactly their period 1 incomes, then no type (at this
interim stage) would want to imitate a higher type if and only if r ≥ 2−νν . In particular,
this implies that the outcomes described in Proposition 1 can no longer be an equilibrium.
Instead, there will be some pooling among diﬀerent types of agents with regard to their
interim payments.
As described below, the outcome will be full pooling in the sense that all types that
borrow from the transparent sector will choose the same contract from the schedule. In
equilibrium only one level of repayment to the transparent sector will be observed. Rather
than the menu of contracts actually taken up in the previous section, borrowing from the
transparent sector will entail the same payment p at t = 1 for all types who have not
liquidated and the same remaining debt q due at t = 2 (which will be fully repaid in the
good state and only partially repaid–depending on type–in the bad state).
Before getting to the result, we first introduce a couple of preliminary results: a “con-
tinuity of pools” lemma and a result on the weak monotonicity of payments with type.
These results rely primarily on the incentive-compatibility constraints of borrowers and, in
particular, require no assumptions about the distribution of types.
Lemma 3 (Continuity of p) For every three borrowers with types α, β, and γ such that
α > β > γ where p(α) = p(γ), it must be the case that p(α) = p(β) = p(γ).
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 4 (Monotonicity of p) For every type α > β that does not liquidate, p(α) ≥ p(β).
Proof. See Appendix.
We proceed to a central result of the paper: that with r suﬃciently low, the only bank
contract taken up by borrowers is a single contract that requires the same first payment
for all borrowing types.
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Proposition 2 When the lending rate from the hidden sector is suﬃciently low (r ≤ 2−νν ),
then all borrowers who do not liquidate pay the same interim payment p(α) = p and owe
the same amount, q, to the bank in period 2.
The proof, which appears in the appendix, has a simple structure: We conjecture
that there must be at least two types that make diﬀerent interim payments and find
a contradiction. We focus on the highest two payments (and by Lemma 4 these will
correspond to the highest diﬀering types). We find that borrowers, at the ex-ante stage
where the contracts are determined, would rather that the top two pools be combined
as a single pool, in order to maximize their anticipated surplus. Since they propose these
contracts, this will be the equilibrium outcome. An induction argument for a finite number
of pools will imply that one overall pool appears as the equilibrium contract.16 There are a
number of diﬀerent cases that must be considered (depending on the level of p and the size
of the pools), but working through each of them is relatively straightforward. It is worth
noting that the assumption that types are uniformly distributed induces linearity into the
model which is a driving force towards the corner solutions that lead to the stark result of
a single pool as the equilibrium outcome.17
Proposition 2 states that the equilibrium contract has only one possible first payment
p and a second payment q that makes the bank break even on average, given the pool of
agents that do not liquidate. In particular, the proposition shows that there are no ways
by which higher types can eﬃciently separate from lower types. This implies some cross-
subsidies from higher to lower types of agents and therefore involves ineﬃcient liquidation
decisions. This fully characterizes the structure of the equilibrium; however, to gain further
insight and in particular to analyze welfare, we proceed by precisely calculating the values
of p, q, and the equilibrium liquidation policy.
3.2.1 Equilibrium payments and welfare
In this section, we characterize the liquidation policy. We then define welfare. In equilib-
rium, since borrowers propose contracts before knowing their types, total welfare will be
maximized. We conclude by characterizing this maximized value.
We begin by introducing some further notation to discuss the liquidation policy. Specif-
16Note that in the case where r > 2−νν an induction argument would be inappropriate because there
could be an infinite number of pools.
17Other distributional assumptions may lead to a finite number of pools but never to full separation. The
uniform distribution helps in keeping the analysis simple.
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ically, let l denote the type that is “just indiﬀerent” between liquidating and continuing
the project with the (p, q) contract. Under perfect information, l = z2 : however, limited
liability and the cross subsidies between agents inside the pool (from higher quality to lower
quality ones) will imply that l < z2 . This reflects an important externality in our model.
Whenever there is some pooling between agents, there will be cross subsidies from agents
of higher quality to the agents of lower quality. This generates an ineﬃcient liquidation
policy, as some ineﬃcient projects are not liquidated due to this implicit subsidy.
In order to characterize l, we begin by arguing that in this equilibrium, there is no loss
in supposing that the first-period payment p will be chosen so that l ≤ p.
Lemma 5 In equilibrium when r < 2−νν , then without loss of generality we can focus on
l ≤ p.
Proof. Suppose that l ≥ p
The conditions that determine l are the indiﬀerence of the marginal agent who decides
to liquidate. This can be expressed as 0 = ν(B + l − q) + (l − p).
A further condition is the break even condition of the bank D = p + νq + (1− ν)1+l2 .
This can be rewritten again as q =
D−p−(1−ν) 1+l
2
ν .
Using these two conditions, we obtain that l = 2z−1+ν3+ν .
18 In particular, therefore, so
long as l ≥ p, p is undetermined, since it will also have no eﬀect on overall welfare. Then,
without loss of generality we can think about l = p.
We proceed by focusing on the case l ≤ p. First note that in the case that l = 0, it is
trivial that the optimal choice of p is p = 0, and overall welfare in this case is W = 1− z
(this is simply the average surplus generated by a project, given that all types of projects
will be pursued).
Alternatively, it may be optimal to choose an interior l. In this case we can characterize
l by noting that a couple of conditions must be satisfied. First, by definition, an agent of
type l must be indiﬀerent between liquidating or continuing with the project; that is,
0 = ν(B + l − q − r(p− l)). (1)
18 In particular this means that conditional on l > p the type of the marginal liquidating agent l is
constant and smaller than z
2
. This is intuitive since for a type α, with α > p then a slightly lower or higher
p makes no diﬀerence–for this α-type borrower with α > p, changes in p merely transfer utility 1-for-1
between periods 1 and 2. Thus conditional on l > p, it is unsurprising that the marginal indiﬀerent l is
independent of p.
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In addition, banks need to break even on average, and so
D = p+ νq + (1− ν)1 + l
2
. (2)
Note that the indiﬀerence condition (1) implies that B + α > q for every α > l, and so it
is appropriate to write the break-even condition as above, being sure that the loan will be
fully repaid if the contract is successful for every borrowing type. Substituting for q from
(2) into (1), we obtain the following expression for l:
l =
2z + ν + 2p(rν − 1)− 1
ν + 2rν + 1
. (3)
We characterize the equilibrium p, under the assumption that both the optimal p and
l are interior. Having done so, it is easy to verify conditions under which this is indeed the
case and then go on to consider outcomes when these conditions fail.
Continuing under the assumption that l is interior, we consider the first order condition,
and we maximize total welfare in order to find the contract oﬀered in the optimal equilib-
rium (other equilibria exist but as discussed at the end of Section 3.1, we focus attention
on the most eﬃcient equilibrium).
We begin with the expression of total welfare.
W =
1Z
l
(2x+ υB −D)dx− (νr − 1)
pZ
l
(p− x)dx
= lz − z − l2 + 1− 1
2
(νr − 1)(p− l)2. (4)
The first term represents the net (positive or negative) welfare from each project fi-
nanced, while the second term is the welfare loss out of ineﬃcient borrowing. Note that
the above condition (in the upper limit of the second integral) supposes that p < 1, which
it will be easy to verify is true in equilibrium.
The first order condition that characterizes the optimal p is:
dW
dp
= (z − 2l) dl
dp
− (νr − 1)(p− l)(1− dl
dp
) = 0, (5)
where, by taking the derivative of l, as defined in equation (3), with respect to p:
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dl
dp
=
2(rν − 1)
2rν + 1 + ν
. (6)
Note that this derivative is strictly positive since rν > 1. One might expect this to be the
case, as the interim payment increases, concealing a low type becomes more costly and so
more projects might be liquidated at t = 1/2.
Substituting expression (6) into (5), the expression that implicitly defines the optimal
first payment p is:
dW
dp
= (z − 2l) 2(rν − 1)
2rυ + 1 + ν
− (νr − 1)(p− l)( 3 + ν
2rυ + 1 + ν
) = 0. (7)
Simple algebraic manipulation yields the following equilibrium expression for the optimal
p:
p =
2z − l + νl
3 + ν
. (8)
We solve simultaneously for p and l from this equation and equation (3) to obtain:
l =
2z + 2ν + 2zν + 4rzν + ν2 − 3
6ν + 8rν + ν2 + 1
(9)
p =
4zν − 2ν + 4rzν + ν2 + 1
6ν + 8rν + ν2 + 1
(10)
and substituting these expressions into equation (4) we can calculate a valueWI for welfare.
The notation WI is intended to highlight that this is the welfare under the optimal interior
solution when it is feasible. However this need not be the global optimum since choosing
p = 0 = l and generating an expected surplus of 1− z is always feasible.
The equilibrium expression for p, Equation (10), together with the break even-condition,
Equation (2), and the expression for l, Equation (9), determine the equilibrium value for
the second payment q.
Lemma 6 Both l and p are interior when z ≥ (3+ν)(1−ν)2(1+ν+2rν) and WI ≥ 1− z.
Proof. Note that p is linear in z. It is suﬃcient therefore to consider the two extremes
z = 0 and z = 2. For z = 2, p = 1. For z = 0, p = (1−ν)
2
6ν+8rν+ν2+1 which is greater than 0
and less than 1. Furthermore for z = 2, l = 1 and l > 0 as long as z > (3+ν)(1−ν)2(1+ν+2rν) .
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For values of z below (3+ν)(1−ν)2(1+ν+2rν) the optimal contract is to set p = 0, which leads to
l = 0.
Thus z ≥ (3+ν)(1−ν)2(1+ν+2rν) is required for an interior l and p to be feasible. An interior l would
generate more surplus and so would be the equilibrium outcome when the welfare generated
is higher than the next best alternative—choosing l = 0 and p = 0, or equivalently:
WI ≥ 1− z.
Note that for z = 2 both z ≥ (3+ν)(1−ν)2(1+ν+2rν) and WI ≥ 1− z hold as strict inequalities, and
so in particular for large enough z, both l and p will be interior.
Equations (9) and (10) show that in the parameter range where l is interior then both
l and p are linear and increasing in z. That they should be increasing is quite intuitive. As
z goes up, projects become less and less attractive, so the optimal first payment p goes up
to increase the liquidation threshold l. On the other hand, as z goes down, more projects
should be funded so p goes down. Further, as z increases the parameters are more likely
to be such that the optimal choice of l is interior and in particular this is always the case
when z = 2.19
3.3 Equilibrium summary
There are three equilibrium regimes. When the hidden lender is relatively ineﬃcient (r >
2−ν
ν ) there is full separation, where each type of borrower who does not liquidate pays an
interim payment equal to the interim cashflow, p = α, and a corresponding second period
payment that accurately assesses the credit-worthiness of the borrower, q = D−α−(1−ν)αν .
Firms get financed as long as α > z2 ; equivalently, projects are financed if and only if
they are eﬃcient. In this region bank contracts have interest rates between period 1 and
period 2 that are contingent on interim payments. These allow the bank to perfectly elicit
information about the agent’s type. If one interprets the long-term contingent contract
as a short-term loan that is renegotiated at t = 1, this would be a situation where the
endogenous costs of renegotiation are low. That is, small changes in p lead to small changes
in q.
When the informal sector is relatively eﬃcient (r < 2−νν ), pooling cannot be avoided,
and in equilibrium only one contract is taken up form the banking sector. The existence
of cross subsidies from higher types to lower ones induces too little liquidation. There are
two cases to consider.
19See Lemma 9 in the appendix.
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If the average project is relatively profitable (z < (3+ν)(1−ν)2(1+ν+2rν)), the welfare loss from
funding ineﬃcient projects is smaller than is the loss from forcing some borrowers to borrow
from the opaque sector. Therefore it is optimal to fund all projects, and in this case there
is no interim payment (p = 0 and q = 2D−1+ν2ν ).
Finally, if the average project is relatively unprofitable (z > (3+ν)(1−ν)2(1+ν+2rν) andWI > 1−z),
the equilibrium will see some types of projects liquidated (l = 2z+2ν+2zν+4rzν+ν
2−3
6ν+8rν+ν2+1 ). All
types that do not liquidate will make an interim payment to the bank and a corresponding
second period payment that takes into account the information implied by the equilibrium
liquidation policy ( p = 4zν−2ν+4rzν+ν
2+1
6ν+8rν+ν2+1 and q =
D−p−(1−υ) l+1
2
υ ). In this case some agents
borrow simultaneously from both sectors. Both sources of ineﬃciency operate in this
regime–namely, some ineﬃcient projects are conducted, and there is some costly borrowing
from the ineﬃcient opaque lender. The bank contract is determined by optimally trading
oﬀ these two sources of ineﬃciency. This situation can also be interpreted as a case where
renegotiation is (endogenously) costly. Any deviation from p would lead to liquidation.
All three regions are non-trivial as illustrated in the diagram below, which illustrates
these three equilibrium regions for a general ν.
19
rz1/v
(2-v)/v
Fully separating contracts
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Interior p
p=0
3.4 Comparative statics on welfare
First note that when r > 2−νν welfare is first best and independent of r within this range.
In the case where the optimal contract involves p = 0, welfare is equal to (1 − z) and,
again, within this range it is independent of r, raising r to a level where either an interior
p is optimal (which requires WI > 1− z) or the full separation equilibium is attained (and
the first best level of welfare is achieved) trivially raises welfare.
The most interesting analysis is for parameters in the region with a single interior
interim payment to the bank–that is, where r ≤ 2−νν . Raising r so that the equilibrium
shifts to the fully separating case, which is first best, trivially raises welfare. We now
consider how welfare varies with r within this region.
Having obtained explicit characterizations of l and p in terms of the exogenous para-
meters of the model and noting that welfare in this region is given by Equation (4), we
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consider the comparative statics of welfare. It is of particular interest, to consider how
welfare changes (and the channels through which it changes) as r, the exogenous rate of
interest in the opaque sector, varies.
First note that in the range r < 2−νν and for z >
(3+ν)(1−ν)
2(1+ν+2rν) and WI ≥ 1− z.
dl
dr
=
4ν(3 + ν)(1− ν)(2− z)
(6ν + 8rν + ν2 + 1)2
> 0. (11)
In particular, this suggests that one source of ineﬃciency is reduced, since as r increases
l rises and so fewer ineﬃcient projects are conducted.
Note also that
dp
dr
= − 4ν(1− ν)
2(2− z)
(6ν + 8rν + ν2 + 1)2
< 0. (12)
As the interim payment falls, and since the lowest type borrowing rises, then the amount
of borrowing from the opaque sector falls; however, since the cost of borrowing from the
opaque sector rises, the welfare consequences may be ambiguous.20 By examining welfare
directly we can see that the first of these two eﬀects always dominates, specifically:
Lemma 7 Proposition 3 Welfare is non-decreasing in the hidden lender’s rate (dWdr ≥
0) and strictly increasing when the lender’s rate is suﬃciently low (r < 2−νν ) and the
proportion of ineﬃcient projects is high ( z > (3+ν)(1−ν)2(1+ν+2rν) and WI > 1− z).
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Partially Hidden Borrowing
We modify the model slightly to allow for a partially hidden lender. We introduce the
possibility that the banking sector observes the level of hidden borrowing of the lender
with some probability (1−h). With probability h, borrowing from the non-banking sector
remains hidden. A rationale for this modelling assumption is that the banking sector
investigates each of its borrowers with some probability (1 − h) and once a borrower is
investigated its borrowing position with all possible alternative lenders is perfectly known
20Note that the welfare as defined in Equation (4) does not take into account surplus gained by the
alternative sector. Including this surplus into the welfare calculation would suggest that the only source
of ineﬃciency would be ineﬃcient liquidation and so only the first eﬀect would apply and the qualitative
results would apply–welfare increases in r. The analysis here would still be of interest, as Equation (4)
captures consumer surplus.
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by the whole banking sector. On the contrary, if a particular borrower is not investigated,
the banking sector cannot observe any borrowing outside the pool of competitive creditors
and is aware of the possibility of some additional lending.
If a borrower is investigated, we assume that the borrower is aware of it, and that she
has the opportunity to repay the opaque sector immediately. Early repayment entails a
cost sd, where d is the amount borrowed from the opaque sector.
If an agent is investigated and repays early, then we know that full separation holds.
By the proof of Proposition 1, if the full separation contract is oﬀered, then there are no
incentives to imitate downwards. With observable payoﬀs there is no feasible way to imitate
upwards as banks would take into account any ineﬃcient borrowing and discount that to
calculate the agent’s true type. Given that the incentive compatibility constraints for the
fully revealing equilibrium hold and that it achieves first best, this is the only equilibrium
once an agent has been investigated.
We make the following assumption to guarantee that early repayment is the optimal
strategy of the borrower once the alternative lender becomes transparent:
Assumption 7 s < r − 1ν .
Lemma 8 Once the hidden borrowing is observed, early repayment is the optimal strategy
for the agent.
Proof. Borrowing from a hidden source gives no concealment benefit, so the only benefit
from that borrowing comes from either investing or consuming those funds. Investing them
at the gross market interest rate of 1 or consuming them gives a (negative) expected utility
of 1 − νr. This loss has to be compared with the cost of early repayment −νs. Early
repayment is therefore the optimal strategy as long as −νs > 1− νr, which is guaranteed
by Assumption 7.
The model with probabilistic observability of the hidden borrowing is therefore like a
switching model in which, with probability (1− h) full separation is achieved for sure and
with probability h the model looks like that of the previous sections. In this latter case the
only diﬀerence is that, from the point of view of the borrower, the costs and benefits of the
hidden borrowing need to be recalculated, since with probability (1−h) hidden borrowing
is useless and entails a cost s.
In fact, once the alternative borrowing remains hidden, the rest of the model with
probabilistic observation of the hidden borrowing can be fully solved by realizing that the
cost of borrowing from the hidden source is now hr+(1−h)sh instead of just r. Borrowing one
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unit from the hidden source costs r with probability h and costs s with probability (1−h).
It only produces some concealment benefit to the borrower with probability h, so the whole
cost has to be re-scaled by h.
We write rh =
hr+(1−h)s
h as the eﬀective interest rate when borrowing from the opaque
sector remains hidden with probability h, the rate of interest is r when borrowing remains
hidden, and the cost of early repayment when the banking sector observes the borrowing
is s. With this notation, we obtain the following results, which are similar to those in the
fully hidden case:
Proposition 4 When the opaque sector lends at a suﬃciently high eﬀective interest rate
(rh > 2−νν ), then there exists an equilibrium where consumers oﬀer the schedule {p(α), q(α)}
with p(α, d) = α and q(α) = D−α−(1−ν)αν and there is no borrowing from the hidden sector.
When the opaque sector lends at a suﬃciently low eﬀective interest rate (rh ≤ 2−νν ), all
types that do not liquidate make the same interim payment p and owe the same amount,
q, to the bank in period 2.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the ones in Propositions 1 and 2 except that now
borrowing from the hidden source entails higher costs, and so further details are omitted.
The functional form of the welfare equation and the incentive compatibility conditions
are similar to those of the basic model, so similar results to those of Section 3.2.1 hold.
In particular, if rh ≤ 2−νν the only possible equilibrium is one of full pooling, and if the
optimal solution is interior then the optimal first payment is:
p =
4zν − 2ν + 4zrhν + ν2 + 1
6ν + 8rhν + ν2 + 1
(13)
and the type of borrower who is just indiﬀerent between liquidating the project and con-
tinuing it is:
l =
2z + 2ν + 2zν + 4rh + ν
2 − 3
6ν + 8rhν + ν2 + 1
. (14)
Total welfare in this regime can be expressed as:
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W =
h
⎡
⎣
1Z
l
(2x+ υB −D)dx− (νr − 1)
pZ
l
(p− x)dx
⎤
⎦
+(1− h)
⎡
⎢⎣
1Z
z
2
(2x+ υB −D)dx− νs
pZ
l
(p− x)dx
⎤
⎥⎦ .
(15)
The first term corresponds to the welfare when the hidden sector remains hidden, while
the second one is related to when it becomes observable. The above expression can be
rearranged as
W = h
⎡
⎣
1Z
l
(2x+ υB −D)dx− (vrh − 1)
pZ
l
(p− x)dx
⎤
⎦+ (1− h)
⎡
⎢⎣
1Z
z
2
(2x+ υB −D)dx
⎤
⎥⎦ .
(16)
Note that the expression in the first bracket is identical to the expression in Section 3
with a change of the social cost of borrowing from r to rh and that the second bracket is
constant in p and l.
The welfare implications of the changes in the probability of the hidden sector becoming
transparent (1 − h) are as follows: A higher (1 − h) implies higher welfare in a couple of
ways. First is the automatic switching from the pooling equilibrium to the first-best full
separation equilibrium whenever the banking sector observes the hidden lending. Second,
increasing (1 − h) increases rh, and so the results on welfare increasing in r from Section
3 apply. Similarly an increase in s raises rh and so also raises welfare.
Note that our analysis is related to the literature on the interactions between direct
screening of lenders through active investigation and the indirect screening that can be
achieved by oﬀering them a menu of contracts, as in Manove et al. (2001). While in most
models these are seen as substitutes, in our model they are complements. That is, an
increase in (1 − h) leads to more information about some borrowers directly and also to
a more informative equilibrium with respect to the other borrowers (who may have loans
from the alternative sector that remain hidden).21
21Even though so far we have considered h as an exogenous parameter, endogenizing it seems relatively
straightforward. We could allow banks to choose their monitoring eﬀort h at a cost. Higher transparency
(lower h) would be more costly and competition among banks should equalize the marginal cost of additional
monitoring (reducing h) with its marginal gain in terms of welfare in equilibrium.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a model in which a banking sector and an alternative opaque
source of lending coexist. The results show that if the alternative source of borrowing
is suﬃciently ineﬃcient, banking contracts will achieve first-best. The optimal contract
gives incentives to borrowers to reveal their intermediate cash flows perfectly by rewarding
higher interim payments with lower future interest rates. However if the alternative source
of borrowing is relatively eﬃcient, then the fully contingent contract is not sustainable as
agents may want to conceal their types by borrowing from the hidden source and repaying
a larger part of their loans early. Here, the optimal contract is not contingent on the
interim payments of the loans. There is only one possible first payment and associated
second payment. The contract fails to achieve first-best for two reasons. First, a number of
ineﬃcient projects are funded, and, second, some borrowers access the ineﬃcient alternative
sector. Note that for some parameters this first payment would be zero and all repayment
would be in the final period. Thus the model can also be seen as characterising the timing
of debt repayments.
It is worth restating that the banks, even though they may be more eﬃcient, cannot
simply replicate the loans provided by the hidden sector. This follows since it is assumed
that a bank is committed to share all information about its loans to other banks. In
principle, one might think that the bank could oﬀer two types of credit and commit not
to act on the information revealed. However, even if the commitment was credible, this
arrangement would lead to cross-subsidies among borrowers that would be observable by
other banks, and so the bank oﬀering this arrangement would suﬀer from cream-skimming
and suﬀer losses.
We show that overall welfare increases if the cost of borrowing from the opaque sector is
higher. This result is in contrast to some conventional wisdom in discussions of developing
economies, which focuses on the role that the informal sector may play in alleviating
the financing constraints. The informal sector lends to firms and households when the
formal sector is rationing them.22 However in our model, as the informal sector gets
more eﬃcient, the banking sector has to oﬀer a less contingent contract, and total welfare
falls. This approach, considering the interaction between formal and informal sectors from
22Jain (1999), who also discusses related literature, provides an explanation for the observation of bor-
rowers in both sectors based on a trade-oﬀ between the formal sector’s lower opportunity cost of funds and
the informal sector’s better information. Instead we assume that the formal sector is unambiguously more
eﬃcient and the informal sector may or may not have an informational advantage.
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an informational point of view, provides a counter-argument to traditional literature by
showing how an eﬃcient informal sector may reduce welfare.
Relaxing the assumption that the alternative sector is not entirely opaque makes it less
appealing for a borrower to use the costly alternative sector to disguise her type as this
may turn out to be ineﬀective. In this case, the qualitative results outlined above carry
through in this richer environment and moreover, welfare is decreasing in the opacity of
the informal sector. These results suggest that as the informational transparency of the
financial sector as a whole improves, banks are able to oﬀer more sophisticated financial
instruments.
While we presented a model of start-up financing for an investment project, the central
mechanisms and in particular the interaction of diﬀerent sources of borrowing and the
implications for contractual form have wide applicability. For example, over the last twenty
years the consumer sector in the UK has seen the development of more flexible mortgages
integrated with checking accounts and credit lines. Intuitions developed through this paper
suggest that this may be partially a consequence of financial institutions having better
means of processing and transferring information about consumer credit histories.
Our results highlight that one of the possible reasons for long-term debt contracts being
inflexible with respect to interim payments is that the information that long-term lenders
would extract from these interim payments would be corrupted by additional borrowing
from hidden sources of funds. They also suggest an explanation for simultaneous borrowing
from diﬀerent sources even when there is a clear pecking order among them and there is
available borrowing from the cheaper one (for example mortgages and credit card borrow-
ing). Finally, we also show that the existence of an alternative opaque source of borrowing
may be welfare diminishing because it may distort the set of contracts that the competitive
lending sector may oﬀer.
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6 Appendix
Proof of lemmas 3 and 4
Proof. Suppose that borrowers face the choice between two generic contracts a and b and
without loss of generality, we label them so that pa > pb. There are a number of cases to
consider:
(i) α > pa > β > pb > γ
(ii) pa > pb > α > β > γ
(iii) α > β > γ > pa > pb
(iv) α > pa > pb > β > γ
(v) α > β > pa > pb > γ
We examine each in turn:
(i) α > pa > β > pb > γ
Agent α will go for contract a whenever
α−pa+ν(B+α−pa−qa−r(pa−α)1pa>α) ≥ α−pb+ν(B+α−pb−qb−r(pb−α)1pb>α)
since α > pa > pb then 1pa>α = 1pb>α = 0 and the above expression can be rewritten
as
ν(qb − qa) ≥ (pa − pb)(1 + ν) (17)
The inequality is independent of α so all the agents with type above pa will make the
same choice.
For an agent of type γ she would the a contract over the b contract whenever
γ−pa+ν(B+γ−pa−qa−r(pa−γ)1pa>γ) ≥ γ−pb+ν(B+γ−pb−qb−r(pb−γ)1pb>γ)
Given that 1pa>γ = 1pb>γ = 1 we can rewrite the above expression as
ν(qb − qa) ≥ (pa − pb)(1 + ν + rν) (18)
Finally an agent of type β will go for contract a over contract b whenever
β−pa+ν(B+β−pa−qa−r(pa−β)1pa>β) ≥ β−pb+ν(B+β−pb−qb−r(pb−β)1pb>β)
Given that 1pa>β = 1 and 1pb>β = 0,
ν(qb − qa) ≥ (pa − pb)(1 + ν) + rν(pa − β) (19)
Given that (pa − pb)(1 + ν) + rν(pa − β) > (pa − pb)(1 + ν) + rν(pa − pb)
and so since γ prefers contract a to contract b, an agent of type β must also prefer
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contract a to contract b.
(ii) pa > pb > α > β > γ
In this case the condition for an α type agent to prefer the a contract over the b contract
is
ν(qb − qa) ≥ (pa − pb)(1 + ν + rν)
which is the identical condition for the β type agent
(iii) α > β > γ > pa > pb
The condition which ensures that the β type agent prefers the a contract over the b
contract is identical to the condition for the α-type agent and for the γ-type agent and so
will hold true in this case.
(iv) α > pa > pb > β > γ
The condition which ensures that the β type agent prefers the a contract over the b
contract is identical to the condition for the γ-type agent and so will hold true in this case.
(v) α > β > pa > pb > γ
The condition which ensures that the β type agent prefers the a contract over the b
contract is identical to the condition for the α-type agent and so will hold true in this case.
In each of the cases therefore if the preferred contract for an α agent is the b contract,
it is also the preferred one for agents β and γ. Similarly, the opposite is also true, if
the γ agent prefers contract a then so do the β and the α agent. This proves Lemma 4.
Furthermore if the preferred contract for both an α agent and a γ agent is a then this is
also the preferred contract for any β-type agent where a > β > γ. This proves Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that this result is false, then there must be
at least two types that pay diﬀerent amounts. We focus on the highest two payments
(and by Lemma 4 these will correspond to the highest diﬀering types). We will find that
in equilibrium, the top two pools would rather be combined as a single pool. Then an
induction argument for a finite number of pools will imply that one overall pool appears
as the equilibrium contract.
We continue by considering the top two pools of types that do not liquidate.
First note that if any type α strictly prefers not to liquidate then all types β > α
would prefer to mimic α than to liquidate. Thus in restricting attention to the highest two
payments p1 < p2 and associated types (and by Lemma 4 we know that higher types are
associated with higher payments) then we can be sure that there are some α1 ≤ α2 such
30
that types (α1, α2] pay p1 in the first period (with the associated q1) and (α2, 1] pay p2 in
the first period (with the associated q2 in the second period).
The proof is somewhat involved but the structure is as follows. First we highlight a
number of possible cases. In each case we seek to determine the optimal choice of α2 (and
associated p1 and p2) given that there are two pools in the range (α1, 1] while keeping α1
indiﬀerent (and so all other types below may also remain with their existing contracts and
there are no changes to equilibrium or welfare consequences from types below α1).23
By definition p2 > p1. There are a number of cases to consider:
I p2 > 1 and p1 > α2
II p2 > 1 and α2 > p1 > α1
III p2 > 1 and α1 > p1
IV 1 > p2 > α2 and p1 > α2
V 1 > p2 > α2 and α2 > p1 > α1
VI 1 > p2 > α2 and α1 > p1
We focus on each in turn and show that the optimum outcome in all cases pushes α2
into a corner.
Recall also that we have q1 =
D−p1−(1−ν)α1+α22
ν and q2 =
D−p2−(1−ν) 1+α22
ν
CASE I p2 > 1 and p1 > α2
The IC condition for α2 is ν(B + α2 − q2 − r(p2 − α2)) = ν(B + α2 − q1 − r(p1 − α2))
which yields q1 − q2 = rp2 − rp1
and substituting in for q1 and q2 and simplifying yields p2 = 1−ννr−1
1−α1
2 + p1
in particular note that dp2dα2 =
dp1
dα2 .
The participation constraint for α1 is ν(B + α1 − q1 − r(p1 − α1)) = k
With p1 = 1νr−1(−k + νB −D + (1− ν)
α1+α2
2 + ν(1 + r)α1)
and note in particular that dp2dα2 =
dp1
dα2 =
1−ν
2(νr−1)
Welfare
Consider overall welfare
W =
R 1
α1(νB −D + 2x)dx− (νr − 1)
R α2
α1 (p1 − x)dx− (νr − 1)
R 1
α2(p2 − x)dx+ cst
Where the constant terms arises from the welfare of those types α < α1
W = (νB−D)(1−α1)+1−α21+(νr−1)
£
−p1(α2 − α1) + 12(α22 − α21)− p2(1− α2) +
1
2(1− α22)
¤
+
cst
so dWdα2 = (νr − 1)(p2 − p1 −
1−ν
2(νr−1)(1− α1))
23While noting that suﬃciently bizarre oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs could justify a wide range of equilibria, we
focus on the most eﬃcient equilibria (which would also be the one preferred by the borrowers).
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This expression cannot be easily signed but note that it is independent of α2 and so
without loss of generality we can maximize welfare taking α2 = p1 and case II applies.
CASE II p2 > 1 and α2 > p1 > α1
The IC condition for α2 is ν(B + α2 − q2 − r(p2 − α2)) = (α2 − p1) + ν(B + α2 − q1)
substituting in the expressions for q1 and q2 gives
ν(B + α2 −
D−p2−(1−ν) 1+α22
ν − r(p2 − α2)) = (α2 − p1) + ν(B + α2 −
D−p1−(1−ν)α1+α22
ν )
which yields p2 = α2 +
(1−ν)(1−α1)
2(rν−1) . In particular, note that
dp2
dα2 = 1.
The participation constraint for α1 is ν(B + α1 − q1 − r(p1 − α1)) = k.
Substituting in the expression for q1
ν(B + α1 −
D−p1−(1−ν)α1+α22
ν − r(p1 − α1)) = k
yields p1 = 1νr−1(−k + νB −D + (1− ν)
α1+α2
2 + ν(1 + r)α1)
and note in particular that dp1dα2 =
1−ν
2(νr−1)
Welfare
Consider overall welfare
W =
R 1
α1(νB −D + 2x)dx− (νr − 1)
R p1
α1 (p1 − x)dx− (νr − 1)
R 1
α2(p2 − x)dx+ cst
W = (νB−D)(1−α1)+1−α21+(νr−1)
£
−p1(p1 − α1) + 12(p21 − α21)− p2(1− α2) +
1
2(1− α22)
¤
+
cst.
and in particular
dW
dα2 = (νr − 1)(−
1−ν
2(νr−1)(p1 − α1)− p1
1−ν
2(νr−1) + p1
1−ν
2(νr−1) − (1− α2) + p2 − α2)
dW
dα2 = (νr − 1)(p2 − 1−
1−ν
2(νr−1)(p1 − α1))
d2W
dα22
= (νr − 1)(1− ( 1−ν2(νr−1))
2)
The FOC dWdα2 = 0 defines a maximum so long as
d2W
dα22
< 0 this is true when
1 < ( 1−ν2(νr−1))
2 or equivalently r < 3−ν2ν .
And so when r > 3−ν2ν then 1 >
1−ν
2(νr−1) and so setting
dW
dα2 = 0 defines a minimum and
so the maximum is at a corner.
In the case when r < 3−ν2ν the FOC defines a maximum rather than a minimum. We
argue that this case is vacuous.
Recall that p1 < α2 < 1. We also know that α1 satisfies p1 = 1νr−1(−k+νB−D+(1−
ν)α1+α22 + ν(1 + r)α1)
so p1 − 1νr−1(−k + νB −D)−
1−ν
(νr−1)
α2
2 = α1
2νr+1+ν
2(νr−1) .
Further p1 < α2 and (νB − D) < 0 so α1 2νr+1+ν2(νr−1) < α2 −
1−ν
(νr−1)
α2
2 and so α1 <
(2(νr−1)−1+ν1+ν+2νr )α2. Given that 2(νr − 1) − 1 + ν < 0 when r <
3−ν
2ν then α1 < 0 which is
impossible.
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CASE III p2 > 1 and α1 > p1
The IC condition for α2 is ν(B + α2 − q2 − r(p2 − α2)) = (α2 − p1) + ν(B + α2 − q1)
which yields p2 = α2 +
(1−ν)(1−α1)
2(rν−1)
The participation constraint for α1 is
α1 − p1 + ν(B + α1 − q1) = k
α1 + νB −D + (1− ν)α1+α22 = k
here p1 is unconstrained
α2 =
k+D−Bν−α1− 12α1(−ν+1)
−1
2
ν+ 1
2
which yields α2 = 21−ν (k +D − νB)− α1
3−ν
2
So here α2 is not a choice variable and so also p2 cannot be freely chosen, the only
choice variable is p1.
Welfare
Consider overall welfare
W =
R 1
α1(νB −D + 2x)dx− (νr − 1)
R 1
α2(p2 − x)dx+ cst
It’s clear that from the welfare perspective p1 is irrelevant and so p1 does not arise,
without loss of generality therefore we can take p1 = α1 and we’re back in case II.
Case IV 1 > p2 > α2 and p1 > α2
The IC condition for α2 is ν(B + α2 − q2 − r(p2 − α2)) = ν(B + α2 − q2 − r(p2 − α2))
p2 =
1−ν
νr−1
1−α1
2 + p1 in particular note that
dp2
dα2 =
dp1
dα2 .
The participation constraint for α1 is ν(B + α1 − q1 − r(p1 − α1)) = k
substituting in the expression for q1
ν(B + α1 −
D−p1−(1−ν)α1+α22
ν − r(p1 − α1)) = k
yields p1 = 1νr−1(−k + νB −D + (1− ν)
α1+α2
2 + ν(1 + r)α1)
and note in particular that dp1dα2 =
1−ν
2(νr−1)
Welfare
Consider overall welfare
W =
R 1
α1(νB −D + 2x)dx− (νr − 1)
R α2
α1 (p1 − x)dx− (νr − 1)
R p2
α2 (p2 − x)dx+ cst
W = (νB−D)(1−α1)+1−α21− (νr− 1)(p1(α2−α1)+ 12(p22−α21)−p2(p2−α2))+ cst
dW
dα2 = −(νr − 1)p1 −
1−ν
2(νr−1)α1 + (νr − 1)p2(2−
1−ν
2(νr−1))
Note that this is independent of α2 and so without loss of generality we can maximize
α2 by setting α2 = min{p1, p2} which would be covered by case V (Note that in case
p2 = α2 the α2 type strictly prefers the higher contract).
Case V 1 > p2 > α2 and α2 > p1 > α1
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The IC condition for α2 is
ν(B + α2 − q2 − r(p2 − α2)) = (α2 − p1) + ν(B + α2 − q1)
substituting in the expressions for q1 and q2 gives
ν(B + α2 −
D−p2−(1−ν) 1+α22
ν − r(p2 − α2)) = (α2 − p1) + ν(B + α2 −
D−p1−(1−ν)α1+α22
ν )
which yields p2 = α2 +
(1−ν)(1−α1)
2(rν−1)
in particular note that dp2dα2 = 1
The participation constraint for α1 is
ν(B + α1 − q1 − r(p1 − α1)) = k
substituting in the expression for q1
ν(B + α1 −
D−p1−(1−ν)α1+α22
ν − r(p1 − α1)) = k
yields p1 = 1νr−1(−k + νB −D + (1− ν)
α1+α2
2 + ν(1 + r)α1)
and note in particular that dp1dα2 =
1−ν
2(νr−1) .
Welfare
Consider overall welfare
W =
R 1
α1(νB −D + 2x)dx− (νr − 1)
R p1
α1 (p1 − x)dx− (νr − 1)
R p2
α2 (p2 − x)dx+ cst
W = (νB −D)(1− α1) + 1− α21 − (νr − 1)(p1(p1 − α1) + 12(p21 − α21) − p2(p2 − α2) +
1
2(p
2
2 − α22)) + cst.
and in particular
dW
dα2 =
1−ν
2(νr−1)(−(νr− 1)(p1−α1)− (νr− 1)p1+(νr− 1)p1)− (νr− 1)(p2−α2)+ (νr−
1)(p2 − α2)
dW
dα2 = −(νr − 1)
1−ν
2(νr−1)(p1 − α1)
so pushed to a corner where α2 = p1.
Case VI 1 > p2 > α2 and α1 > p1
The IC condition for α2 is ν(B + α2 − q2 − r(p2 − α2)) = (α2 − p1) + ν(B + α2 − q1)
which yields p2 = α2 +
(1−ν)(1−α1)
2(rν−1)
The participation constraint for α1 is
α1 − p1 + ν(B + α1 − q1) = k
α1 + νB −D + (1− ν)α1+α22 = k
and so here p1 is unconstrained but
α2 =
k+D−Bν−α1− 12α1(−ν+1)
−1
2
ν+ 1
2
which yields α2 = 21−ν (k +D − νB)− α1
3−ν
2
So here α2 is not free and so also p2 is not freely determined, the only free variable is
p1.
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Welfare
Consider overall welfare
W =
R 1
α1(νB −D + 2x)dx−
R 1
α2(p2 − x)dx+ cst
It’s clear that from the welfare perspective p1 is irrelevant since p1 does not arise,
without loss of generality therefore we can take p1 = α1 and we’re back in case V
Checking corners
Finally, it remains to consider what it means for α2 to be pushed into a corner in each
of these cases and whether it necessarily leads to a contradiction.
There are a number of possibilities, first α2 = p1 and 1 > α2 > α1 with either p2 > 1
or 1 > p2 > α2. We show that this cannot be the case unless either α2 > 1 or α2 = α1.
In either case the IC for α2 is
p2 = α2 +
1−ν
2(νr−1)(1− α1)
and the IC for α1 is
ν(B + α1 − q1 − r(p1 − α1)) = k
substituting in the expression for q1 and that p1 = α2 yields
ν(B + α1 −
D−p1−(1−ν)α1+α22
ν − r(α2 − α1)) = k
simplifying we obtain
α2 =
1
ν+2rν−3 (2Bν − 2D − 2k + α1 + να1 + 2rνα1)
The case is not degenerate, that is in equilibrium these top two pools do not collapse
into one, as long as α2 is interior which it needs to be. In particular, it must be that both
α2 > α1 and 1 > α2. We begin by considering the first of these two conditions
α2 > α1 if and only if
1
ν+2rν−3 (2Bν − 2D − 2k + α1 + να1 + 2rνα1) > α1
Which happens if and only if α1 > 12(1 + k)
Now consider the second of the two conditions that are required for the top two pools
to survive and not degenerate into a single pool, namely that α2 < 1. This requires that
1
ν+2rν−3 (2Bν − 2D − 2k + α1 + να1 + 2rνα1) < 1
which is true if and only if
2Bν − 2D − 2k + α1 + να1 + 2rνα1 < ν + 2rν − 3
Which happens if and only if α1 < ν+2rν−1+2k(1+ν+2rν)
and so in particular, using that α1 > 12(1 + k), we require
ν+2rν−1+2k
(1+ν+2rν) >
1
2(1 + k)
so 2(ν + 2rν − 1 + 2k)− (1 + ν + 2rν)(1 + k) > 0
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Which happens if and only if k > 1 which is impossible–the utility for the best possible
type when recognized as the best possible type is for type 1 recognized as such who gets
a profit of νB −D + 1 + 1 = 1 and so it cannot be that k, which is the profit for the α1
type, is greater than 1.
It remains to consider the cases when either p2 > 1 > α2 > α1 = p1 (and here pushed
to a corner means α2 goes to 1 or to α1 either way there is just one pool rather than two)
or 1 > p2 > α2 > α1 = p1. In this final case being pushed to a corner means that α2 goes
to α1 and so there is a single pool and the requisite contradiction, otherwise α2 is pushed
to p2 then 1 > p2 = α2 > α1 = p1.
In this last case, the IC condition for α2 is
ν(B + α2 − q2) = (α2 − α1) + ν(B + α2 − q1) (20)
Substituting for q1 and q2 we obtain
1
2
να1 −
1
2
α1 −
1
2
ν +
1
2
= 0 (21)
which requires α1 = 1.
Note that it is possible to have full separation with α1 = 1 only in the case that the
top pool is infinitesimally thin–the full separation case, but with a finite number of pools
such an outcome is ruled out.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 9 The condition WI ≥ 1− z is more likely to hold the larger is z.
Proof. First note WI ≥ 1− z if and only if
A = (2z + 2ν + 2zν + 4rzν + ν2 − 3)(6ν + 8rν + ν2 + 1)2z − 2(2z + 2ν + 2zν + 4rzν +
ν2 − 3)2 − (νr − 1)(4zν − 2ν + 4rzν + ν2 + 1− (2z + 2ν + 2zν + 4rzν + ν2 − 3))2 ≥ 0
A = 2z−8ν−16rν+8zν+16rzν+20ν2−8ν3−2ν4+32rν2−16rν3−20zν2+4z2ν+8zν3+
2zν4 − 32rzν2 + 4rz2ν + 16rzν3 + 24z2ν2 + 4z2ν3 + 56rz2ν2 + 4rz2ν3 + 32r2z2ν2 − 2
Taking the derivative with respect to z yields
dA
dz = 8ν(1−ν)+16rν(1−ν)2+8zν+8rzν−12ν2+8ν3+2ν4+48zν2+8zν3+112rzν2+
8rzν3 + 64r2zν2 + 2
note that this latter is linear in z and in r and takes minimal value when z = 0 then
dA
dz = 8ν − 20ν2 + 8ν3 + 2ν4 + 16rν(1− ν)2 + 2
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which is linear in r and takes it’s minimal value when r = 1ν
then dAdz = 8ν
3 − 4ν2 − 24ν + 2ν4 + 18
which it can be easily verified is non-negative in the range ν is in (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We begin by considering the parameter range r < 2−νν , z >
(3+ν)(1−ν)
2(1+ν+rν) and WI >
1− z. In this range W =WI .
Note that p − l = 2(1−ν)(2−z)
6ν+8rν+ν2+1 and so
d(p−l)
dr = −
16ν(1−ν)(2−z)
(6ν+8rν+ν2+1)2 . Next, by taking the
derivative of W with respect to r from Equation 4, we obtain:
dW
dr
=
dl
dr
(1− 2l)− 1
2
ν(p− l)2 − (νr − 1)(p− l)d(p− l)
dr
. (22)
Substituting in the expressions for dldr and
d(p−l)
dr and simplifying
dW
dr
=
4ν + 16ν2 − 40ν3 + 16ν4 + 4ν5 + 32rν2 − 64rν3 + 32rν4
2(6ν + 8rν + ν2 + 1)3
(2− z). (23)
The denominator of this expression is positive and (2− z) > 0 and so dWdr has the same
sign as the numerator of the fraction
sign(dWdr ) = sign(4ν + 16ν
2 − 40ν3 + 16ν4 + 4ν5 + 32rν2 − 64rν3 + 32rν4)
= sign(1 + 4ν − 10ν2 + 4ν3 + ν4 + 8rν − 16rν2 + 8rν3)
(24)
where the second equality holds since 4ν > 0.
It follows that dWdr > 0 if and only if 1+4ν− 10ν2+4ν3+ ν4+8rν− 16rν2+8rν3 > 0,
which is true if and only if:
1 + 4ν − 10ν2 + 4ν3 + ν4
16ν2 − 8ν − 8ν3 > r. (25)
Note that 2−νν > r ≥
1
ν and so
dW
dr > 0 requires
1 + 4ν − 10ν2 + 4ν3 + ν4
16ν2 − 8ν − 8ν3 >
1
ν
, (26)
or equivalently,
4ν3 − 2ν2 − 12ν + ν4 + 9 > 0 (27)
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which is always true for ν in the range (0, 1).
Outside of the parameter range r < 2−νν , z >
(3+ν)(1−ν)
2(1+ν+rν) and WI > 1 − z,
dW
dr = 0
trivially since W is independent of r.
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